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 In early December 2011, protests began to be held in Moscow that would culminate 
in the largest public demonstrations since the fall of the Soviet Union. Organized in 
response to the Duma elections, which were widely viewed as fraudulent, the first protests 
attracted 5,000-7,000 participants, but grew to 100,000-120,000 participants in the lead-up to 
the presidential election. Participants in these events brought demands for free and fair 
elections out into the streets on a large scale for the first time. Similarly, as the presidential 
election neared, their rhetoric became increasingly critical of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, 
openly mocking him and calling for his removal from power.  
These protests, the scale of their participation and their demands were largely 
unexpected and even surprising, given that under Putin‘s leadership, public political 
participation had been low. Assuming office at the end of the turbulent 1990s, Putin had 
ushered in an era of stability and economic growth that was accompanied by the 
centralization of power and a gradual winnowing of civil liberties that increased barriers to 
participation in political life. In fact, political quiescence so closely followed economic 
prosperity that scholars and experts theorized that an informal social contract existed, 
wherein the population stayed quiet and Putin provided stability and growth.   
During the 1990s and for most of the Putin era, when protests did occur, they 
tended to be outside the capital and relatively small in size (Robertson 2013). Protests largely 
addressed social-economic concerns, including welfare benefits, as with the 2005 pensioners‘ 
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demonstrations against the monetization of benefits; labor disputes, as in the Pikalevo 
protests against unpaid wages in 2009; or other issues, as in the protests against increasing 
tariffs on imported cars in Vladivostok, where the local economy is driven by auto imports 
from Asia, in 2008-2009. Following the 2005 demonstrations against the monetization of 
benefits, protest began to shift toward the capital. With increased centralization, Moscow 
became the audience for the majority of political claims (Robertson 2013). As protests 
moved to Moscow, claims became increasingly political; for example, demonstrations were 
held against certain laws or in support of a specific criminal justice issue (Robertson 2013). 
Though the electoral cycle protests were in line with this trend, they departed from earlier 
events, in that they were of a notably larger scale and expressed more overt political 
demands and dissatisfaction; in fact, later protests were about expressing negative feelings 
toward the state and the regime leadership, rather than making a specific claim.  
Another surprising aspect of the electoral cycle protests was the demographic 
composition of the participants. Survey data has shown that the crowds at the largest 
protests in March and February were overwhelmingly comprised of members of Moscow‘s 
developing middle class, which is a break from their established behavior. During the 2000s, 
Russia‘s developing middle class was considered to be politically apathetic. Gudkov, Dubin 
and Zorkaia (2009: 44) found that only 6 percent of middle class young people would 
―definitely like to take part‖ in political life. Overall, middle class young people exhibited 
opinions about Russia that were consonant with the Russian population at large, including 
beliefs about high value of stability in society, the necessity of restoring Russia‘s reputation 
as a strong, independent global power, and approval of Vladimir Putin‘s leadership (Gudkov 
et al. 2009: 66). Even major crises, such as the global financial crisis did not seem to stir the 
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middle class to political action. What middle class political participation that did occur was 
limited, and organized around specific goals that were not overtly political at the outset, for 
example the campaign to save the Khimki forest outside of Moscow. 
The 2011-2012 electoral cycle protests seemed to be an abrupt break with the 
longstanding trend of political apathy. The middle class entered political life in dramatic 
fashion, with massive, highly publicized and creatively organized street protests. Why did 
Moscow‘s middle class suddenly buck their politically apathetic reputation and begin 
protesting in large numbers?  
The announcement that Putin would run for president with Medvedev as his prime 
minister and the fraudulent Duma elections on December 4, 2011 were the proximate 
motivation for the protests. On September 24, Medvedev announced at the United Russia 
congress that he would not seek re-election, but would serve as Putin‘s prime minister—a 
switch-up that was known as the rokirovka, after the Russian term for castling in chess. The 
rokirovka alarmed and dismayed the public as it effectively conferred the title of President 
upon Putin and denied the electorate the opportunity to choose between Putin and 
Medvedev. It was particularly offensive to Medvedev‘s liberal, Western-looking support 
base, who had supported Medvedev‘s rhetoric of rule of law and modernization, and who 
felt they had been made to look like fools. This group, concentrated in urban areas and 
drawing from the emergent middle class, formed an anti-electorate, for whom Putin‘s 
strongman, traditionalist image and statist politics does not appeal (Belanovsky, 2011: 7). 
The rokirovka laid a foundation of anger, frustration and in some respects nihilism directed at 
United Russia and Putin. In the lead-up to the Duma elections, opposition parties and 
activists coordinated a campaign encouraging people to vote for any party other than United 
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Russia, and a many young people in the Moscow area signed up to work as election 
monitors. Many of the people who coordinated the earliest protests following the Duma 
elections would later identify the rokirovka as the beginning of the protest movement. This 
reaction, however, is not necessarily obvious in a country that has never had a transition of 
executive power that was not heavily managed, with the outcome almost predetermined. 
This paper in part explores what preexisting political attitudes might have made the rokirovka 
so unpleasant.  
The fraudulent Duma elections are a second proximate and most immediate cause 
for the protests. Held on December 4, 2011, the Duma election featured poorly executed, 
widespread fraud was widely acknowledged. The OSCE/ODHIR election-monitoring 
mission judged the vote as bad or very bad in one third of polling stations it observed, and 
GOLOS, a foreign-funded domestic election monitoring organization, found from statistical 
analysis that Moscow experienced ―massive falsifications‖ (OSCE/ODIHR 2012: 18; 
GOLOS 2011: 10). In addition to the official monitors, some Russians volunteered as 
election monitors, particularly in Moscow. Video clips of fraud captured on cell phones 
appeared online beginning before voting in Moscow even began, featuring polling stations in 
Vladivostok. When United Russia officially won a solid victory in Moscow, many people 
immediately felt that these results were insultingly and obviously fraudulent. One volunteer 
election monitor in Moscow, Ilya Faybisovich, was forcibly removed from his polling place, 
and, after venting his frustration to like-minded friends, rapidly organized the December 5 
protest, which attracted 5,000 participants (de Vogel 2013). He and his friends accomplished 
this by using personal networks to recruit the participation of their peers: highly educated; 
students, creative professionals and entrepreneurs (de Vogel 2013). More successful protests 
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of increasing size followed, evolving into the group, For Fair Elections. Clearly the Duma 
election touched a nerve among the emergent urban middle class, but it is not clear why. The 
Duma election was comparably corrupt as its predecessors, which had passed without major 
incident. In fact, in the lead-up to the 2011 election, the public had a high expectation of 
fraud and a low interest in the election in general.1 It therefore seems possible that longer-
term trends might underlie the rejection of the Duma election by the urban middle class.   
For this study, I analyze several interrelated hypotheses to address this question. The 
first asks whether the global financial crisis had a significant effect on the development of 
protest sentiment. Though it appeared to have no immediate negative impact on Putin‘s 
popularity, it is possible that the global financial crisis could have had a longer-term effect as 
personal finances were impacted over time or the economy failed to recover as quickly as 
expected. This hypothesis addresses the possibility that the social contract between Putin 
and the middle class was sundered by the economic crisis. This hypothesis also asks whether 
the economic crisis might have had a longer term effect on political attitudes, as studies 
conducted immediately following the crisis have generally concluded that it had no effect on 
Putin‘s popularity. The second hypothesis addresses rising interest in liberal democratic 
issues, for example human rights and corruption. This hypothesis considers whether the 
values conventionally exhibited by the middle classes in liberal states are becoming more 
prevalent in Moscow‘s middle class. Finally, a third hypothesis addresses middle class 
                                                 
1 ―Do you think the upcoming Duma elections will be fair or will fraud and manipulation be used?‖ 
Manipulation and fraud – 34%; serious manipulation and fraud – 12%; obstruction – 12%. ―Is the 
Duma election a real struggle for power by parties or is it just an imitation of a struggle, with seats 
distributed by authorities?‖ An imitation of the struggle and the distribution of seats in the Duma will 




assessments of government effectiveness. Perceptions of government effectiveness—or lack 
thereof—could be related to calls for free and fair elections. To call for free and fair 
elections indicates that you believe politicians are using fraud to remain in power and are not 
doing their jobs well, and that a freely elected official could do it better. Other assessments 
of government effectiveness may thus have inspired these election-related protests, including 
the state‘s ability to deliver services and to address major issues, such as terrorism. Simply 
put, if Putin‘s popularity stems from positive regime performance, a drop in that support 
might stem from a negative assessment of regime performance. 
These trends will be examined using data gathered over 9 surveys conducted by the 
All-Russia Public Opinion Research Center (WCIOM) between March 2008 and March 2012 
responding to the question ―What is the most important problem for the country?‖  This 
study will focus on the change over time in the answers of respondents displaying 
characteristics of the urban professional middle class. This analysis will then be compared 
with the results of a similar survey of members of the middle class conducted by Graeme 
Robertson in late February-early March 2012. 
My analysis will demonstrate that corruption and red tape, the standard of living, 
housing and utilities, healthcare and education were of increasing concern to middle class 
groups in this period. I argue that higher expectations for enhanced quality of life or the 
escalating issue of corruption might inform concern for these issues. Contrary to 
expectations, the concerns of the middle class were not significantly different from those of 
the general population. Members of the middle class did, however, tend to be more critical 
when assessing all problems. Most critical of all groups were residents of Moscow and St. 
Petersburg, which suggests residents of the capitals, regardless of their socio-economic 
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status, are more likely to make demands of the state. Finally, I show that participants in the 
2011-2012 protests in the major cities shared similar concerns with the general population, 
but for most, participation in the protests made them significantly more interested in 
democracy. This result suggests that concern for democracy is highly responsive to current 
events, rather than a continual concern in citizens‘ lives.  
This paper begins with a working definition of the urban professional middle class 
and methodological design, then considers in turn results relating to economic, liberal-
democratic and state efficacy concerns, and compares these results to the second data set. 
The final section draws conclusions.  
 
II. Defining Russia’s Middle Class 
 An emergent middle class almost by definition fails to fulfill the criteria by which a 
middle class is judged in the West. Some typical middle class characteristics or behaviors 
might clearly be present in the emergent middle class, while other attributes might be less 
widespread2; thus, it may be difficult to identify an emergent middle class using the same 
criteria as one might apply to a consolidated middle class. Further muddling the picture are 
conflicting definitions of and approaches to studying the middle class, particularly in the 
Russian literature, leading scholars to ask if the class even exists (Beliaeva 1999; Avraamova 
2002; Samson and Krasil‘nikova 2012). Meanwhile, others have asserted that Russia‘s middle 
                                                 
2 For example, in Russia rates of long-term savings among the middle class, which is expected of a 
middle class, are very low as compared to other societies. 
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class is healthy and growing (Ganske 2007), stabilized (Grigoryev and Salmina 2011), 
embryonic (Gudkov, Dubin and Sorkaia 2009), and simply weak.3 
Remington (2011) isolates three main definitional approaches to Russia‘s middle 
class. The first definition assesses a spectrum of social markers, for example educational level 
or income level, but depending on the criteria used to define the middle class, this statistical 
approach has not yielded consistent results across studies. This approach also cannot be 
directly related to the so-called middle class values present in other societies. These values 
are addressed by the second definition, which approaches the middle class as a cohesive 
social collectivity that acts to bring about historical change in society, for example 
democratization or modernization; this approach sees the middle class as agents playing a 
specific societal role. The third definition also sees the middle class as exhibiting a set of 
values and behaviors, but lacking social cohesion. This normative approach considers such 
criteria as work ethic and attitudes towards politics. Within and between these three 
approaches, there is little consensus as to the shape and size of Russia‘s emergent middle 
class, but, according to Remington‘s expansive survey of work on the middle class, most 
studies found that between 20 to 30 percent of the population might fall into the middle 
class. 
 As this study seeks to draw conclusions about changing values and behaviors of 
Moscow‘s middle class, and speculates as to its societal role and collective action, I will use 
the first approach to assessing the middle class, employing a constellation of social markers. 
This approach was used by Gudkov, Dubin and Zorkaia (2009) in a survey of educated, 
                                                 
3 See Samson and Krasil‘nikova (2012) for a survey of major approaches to Russia‘s middle class. 
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high-income young people in fourteen of Russia‘s major cities4, which aimed to select 
respondents who corresponded closely to the middle class of developed countries in the 
West or who might fall into an eventual established middle class in Russia. This approach 
recognizes that consensus around a definition of the middle class remains elusive, while 
allowing us to define what might signal its existence. This comparative definition is bolstered 
by the fact that the Russian middle class is often viewed on similar terms as that of the 
United States, because the countries share similar levels of inequality (Grigoryev and Salmina 
2011: 5).  
For the purposes of the present study, the middle class will be assessed according to 
four criteria. The first criterion is educational level: respondents must have at least some 
university-level education, which includes degrees in progress as well as completed degrees. 
The second is occupation as a businessman/entrepreneur or specialist with higher education.  
Government officials or administrative authorities might account for a portion of the middle 
class according to income measurements, but are not included for the purpose of this study, 
as their dependency on and deep involvement with the state complicates any assessments of 
their political motivations. The third criterion is self-assessment of purchasing power: 
respondents able to afford expensive consumer durables. Finally, those with income over 
50,000 rubles (US$1,618) per month will also be considered. This is significantly higher than 
the mean income of approximately 20,000 rubles (US$647) per month.5 However, the higher 
income bracket will be used because this study addresses residents of Moscow, who make 
                                                 
4 Moscow, St. Petersburg, Voronezh, Nizhniy Novgorod, Perm, Yekaterinburg, Novosibirsk, 




significantly more money and have a much higher cost of living than residents outside the 
capital. 
Using these criteria, we can establish that the participants in the protests that marked 
the 2011-2012 electoral cycle were in fact members of the middle class. The organizers of 
the protests commissioned the Levada Center to conduct polls during the events held on 
December 24, 2011 and February 4, 2012. The results clearly establish the participants as 
middle class. Firstly, participants had a notably high level of education (see figure 1.1). On 
December 24, 83 percent of participants either had or were in the process of obtaining a 
university degree.6 On February 4, 81 percent had or were obtaining a degree. Their 
vocational backgrounds (figure 1.2) also fit the middle class profile: 71 percent of 
participants on December 24 and 59 percent of participants on February 4 identified 
themselves as specialists, managers or business-owners. When describing their purchasing 
power (figure 1.3), the largest segment of participants at both protests could afford only 
moderately priced consumer durables (refrigerator or television set), with 40 percent on 
December 24 and 41 percent on February 4 describing their economic position in this way. 
28 percent on December 24 and 24 percent on February 4 said they could afford a car, 
slightly more than said they were not able to afford more than the essentials. Data about 
monthly income was not gathered. Nonetheless, this group clearly fits within our set of 
social markers. 
                                                 
6 At both protests, the percentage of participants with partially completed degrees was approximately 
the same as the percentage who were students, thus it can be assumed that these are not drop-outs 




Source: Levada Center, Press Release: Survey at the Meeting on February 4, 13 February 2011, 
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Figure 1.1: Level of  education of  participants in December 24 






















Figure 1.2: Vocational background of  participants in December 






Source: Levada Center, Press Release: Survey at the Meeting on February 4, 13 February 2011, 
accessed 8 April 2013 <http://www.levada.ru/13-02-2012/opros-na-mitinge-4-fevralya> 
 
The protest participants also exhibited a characteristic expected of the middle class 
that had in large part been absent in Russia: they were politically active. Though political 
apathy has been observed in Russian middle class through the 2000s, a typical middle class 
or bourgeoisie has long been seen as a cornerstone of a strong democracy, in that they 
become involved in politics to protect their rights. These theories envisage the middle class 
as a social collectivity acting as an agent of historical change.7 As members of the middle 
class become more financially stable, they also become more engaged in politics to protect 
their interests and property. They thus begin to act as a check on the unconstrained power 
of the state. This mode of conceptualizing the middle class also adds to the earlier definition 
a set of expected values and behaviors, including support for the rule of law, government 
transparency and accountability, and the democratic process. Russia‘s emergent middle class 
has not begun to exhibit these values or behaviors on a large scale, even though its members 
                                                 
7 See, for example, Seymour Lipset, ―Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development 













Figure 1.3: Purchasing Power of  participants in December 24 







are enjoying increased prosperity, its share of society is growing, interest in joining its ranks 
is increasing, and Putin himself has advocated that the middle class play a more active role in 
society. 
Several explanations have been put forth for the lack of political activity among the 
middle class. Marshall Goldman (2006) argues that the avenue by which Russia‘s middle class 
has accumulated its wealth deviates from the Western standard. In the West, hard work and 
creativity are seen as instrumental to success in business; the self-made man at the helm of 
his own enterprise is the ideal. In Russia, the dominant model is that of the oligarchs, who 
are viewed as stealing their wealth from a complicit government and who met their downfall 
at the hands of the state. Would-be entrepreneurs constantly encounter red tape and 
corruption. Both the precedent of the oligarchs and the prevalence of corruption affirm the 
central and somewhat threatening role of the state in the survival of business enterprises, 
which discourages businessmen from displaying values or behaviors that challenge the state. 
Moreover, the state bureaucracy employs a significant and growing portion of what would be 
the middle class. These people are naturally less inclined to hold or express points of view 
that might be seen as oppositional.  
Belanovsky, Dmitriev, Misikhina and Omelchuk (2011: 42) argue that the economic 
crises of the 1990s seriously weakened the small, nascent middle class, by eliminating their 
savings and developing social influence; the middle class is still recovering from this blow 
(26). They also note that the issue of social transfers is less of a concern for members of the 
middle class than for the population at large. As public political discourse and protest 
behavior has in large part been organized around the issue of social transfers, it is possible 
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that the middle class did not see that avenue as appropriate for the expression of their 
interests.  
 One of the most widely referenced explanations for middle class political apathy 
theorizes an informal social contract between society and Putin, wherein the public is 
politically quiescent in exchange for stability and economic success. Entering office after the 
tumultuous 1990s, Putin acted quickly to build the power verticals that re-established 
hierarchical control of the Kremlin at a national and sub-national level; the power verticals 
centralized, eliminated open political competition and contributed to the institutionalization 
of semi-authoritarianism (Gelman 2011: 451). Functionally, the power vertical is constructed 
as a principal-agent relationship between the center and the regions, where regional elites are 
free to pursue private interests in exchange for the delivery of electoral results, the 
prevention of unrest and mass protest, and the achievement of stated policy goals (Gelman, 
2011, 456). The power verticals precipitated a contraction of civil liberties, as agents arranged 
increasingly fraudulent elections and limited opportunity for protest using a broad array of 
strategies both at the center and in the regions. During this process, however, the Russian 
economy enjoyed a consistent period of growth driven by rising oil prices, and living 
standards rose for most Russians. Thus, it appeared that an informal quid pro quo had been 
arranged: the public accepted Putin‘s steps toward semi-authoritarianism in exchange for 
increased prosperity, higher standards of living, a respite from economic and political 
upheaval, and the promise that Russia would return to the great-power status it once had.  
 This arrangement is commonly described as a social contract between society and 
Putin, but this euphemism assumes the Russian population shares a collective agency and 
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particular set of political desires.8 Given the limitations on free and fair elections, the 
obstacles to political participation, restrictions on civil society, and the complexity and 
obscure nature of intra-elite politics, it is unclear to what extent the public could have 
resisted Putin‘s advancement of semi-authoritarianism, had it wanted to.9 Further, the notion 
of the social contract assumes that the public has given up something of value in the 
compromise, specifically the full array of political and civil freedoms available in a liberal, 
Western democracy. In fact, Russians did not have a full array of rights to bargain with, as 
Russia was not a consolidated democracy, though they did experience a perceptible decline 
in freedoms.  Moreover, it is not obvious that Russians placed a very high value on those 
rights in the first place. As Arkady Ostrovsky has put it, ―there is nothing more misleading 
than to portray Russia as a liberal-minded society suppressed by a nasty bunch of former 
KGB agents‖ (2009: 74). Putin‘s popularity, even considering the relative lack of alternatives, 
is considerable, and cannot be explained by the theory of the social contract. Nonetheless, 
the idea of the social contract has been widely discussed in Russia, for example in an 
extensive 2011 series of articles in Vedomosti10 written by experts who had participated in 
debates on the issue during the 2011 Perm Economic Forum.  
 Regardless, through Putin‘s first two terms as president, the growing middle class in 
particular was seen as a major beneficiary of stability and growth. Spending new income on 
                                                 
8 See also, for example, Makarkin and Oppenheimer (2011) and Greene (2012). 
9 It is also important to note that the idea of a social contract was not Putin‘s invention, and 
the conversation about it predated its association with him. See for example Alexander 
Auzan (2009), who founded of the Institute for a National ‗Social Contract‘ in 2000. 
10 Articles were published throughout the summer of 2011 in Vedomosti, following the 2011 
meeting of the Perm Economic Forum. Authors included Sergey Vorobyov, Kirill Rogov, 
Oleg Chirkunov, Vadim Volkov and Bulat Stolyarov.  
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luxury goods, durables and foreign travel, the middle class remained absent from political 
life, although in other countries, the middle class had assumed a larger role in politics as their 
wealth grew.  When the global financial crisis hit Russia in 2008-9, it dealt a serious blow to 
the stability and growth that many perceived had guaranteed Putin‘s popularity. Leading 
economists Igor Yurgens and Yevgeny Gontmakher both predicted the collapse of the social 
contract: as incomes declined and the economy contracted, the public would protest in large 
numbers to demand expanded civil rights (quoted in Teague 2011: 422). Arkady Ostrovsky 
forecasted that the post-financial crisis unraveling of the social contract could cause 
widespread, intense ―upheaval‖ that could critically destabilize the state (2009: 72). Yet even 
though small-scale protests around local economic, welfare and labor issues occurred in the 
regions, it had little effect on Putin‘s approval rating. Putin‘s popularity barely decreased 
from approximately 88 percent approval in September 2008 to a still considerable 81 percent 
one year later, with a low-point of 74 percent in April 2009, perhaps suggesting that the 
social contract, if it existed, was more durable than expected.11  
 
III. Hypotheses 
 Survey data collected between March 2008 and March 2012 will be used to test 
increasing concern for economic, democratic and state efficacy issues. Respondents 
(n=1,600) of a variety of backgrounds from across Russia were able to select multiple 
responses to the question ―Which of the following issues are most important to the 
country?‖ For the purposes of this study, I will look at responses from (1) respondents with 
                                                 




three or more years of university; (2) respondents working as businessmen or entrepreneurs, 
or specialists with higher education, science or culture, excluding state employees; (3) 
respondents earning 50,000 rubles or more per family member per month; (4) respondents 
easily able to purchase medium-priced consumer durables or expensive durables; (5) 
respondents from Moscow or St. Petersburg. Specifically, I will assess problems that were of 
increasing concern during the time period in question. These results will be compared to the 
responses of the general population, and a separate survey conducted of members of the 
middle class, including those that participated in the electoral cycle protests. 
I have separated the possible survey responses into three categories, corresponding 







                                                 
12 Surveys also included five additional answers representing social problems: alcoholism and drug 
abuse; crime; demographic crisis (births and deaths); state of morality and ethics; and youth 
development. These responses are excluded from the following analysis, because they encompass 
issues over which the government has no specific control. While the state has attempted to address 
all of these issues in some respect, from restricting access to alcohol to offering incentives for having 
larger families, these problems cannot purely be attributed to the state. It is just as likely that a survey 
respondent would, for example, blame crime on criminals, rather than the police force, or the state of 
morality in society on certain social groups, rather than the state. A growing concern for these issues 
might thus indicate an anxiety about society in general, or social decay or dysfunction, rather than 
about the state. Some of these problems may also reflect the continuing challenges of the post-Soviet 
transition; for example, concern over the state of morality and ethics in society has been linked to the 
end of the state‘s authority on moral issues (Gorshkov 2012: 85).  
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Table 1.1: Classification of Responses to ““Which of the following issues are most important to the country?” 
 
 
 Response options classed as economic pertain directly to the economy or to directly 
address economic issues that impact individuals‘ lives. Option 1.b addresses economic crisis 
directly, while three others (1.a delays in the payment of salaries, 1.c inflation and 1.d 
unemployment) all reflect negative impacts of the crisis in Russia. It is important to note that 
economic problems might be seen as the responsibility of the state, and thus better framed 
in the state efficacy category. For the purposes of this study, responses were classed in the 
state efficacy category only if the state has direct control over the problem in question. In 
the economic category, the greater systemic issue of the global financial crisis underpins the 
responses. While unemployment and inflation clearly can be helped or hindered by 
government policies, their increase was the result of the crisis. Likewise the late payment of 
H.1. Economic H.2. Liberal-
Democratic 
H.3. State Efficacy 
(a) Delays in payment 
of salaries* 
(b) Economic Crisis* 
(c) Inflation, rising 
prices of goods and 
services 
(d) Unemployment 
(e) The standard of 
living of the population 
(a) Corruption and red 
tape 
(b) Democracy and 
human rights 
(c) Ecology and 
environment 
(d) Influence of 
oligarchs on economic 
and political life of the 
country 
(a) Pension benefits 
(b) Terrorism 
(c) The situation in the 
army 
(d) The situation in the 
education sector 
(e) The situation in the 
health sector 
(f) The situation in the 
sphere of housing 
(ZhKKh) and utility 
services (ZHKU) 
* Response option not available for October 2006 and March 2008 surveys. 
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salaries may be attributed to the management or owners of firms, but in a broader sense is 
only an issue because of the crisis. Moreover, significant evidence suggests that Russians may 
not have viewed the crisis as the responsibility of the Russian government, because the 
Kremlin represented the crisis as the product of mainly American malfeasance of which 
Russia was merely the victim (see Teague, 2011; Feklyunina and White, 2011). 
 The second category encompasses liberal-democratic concerns that address the 
protection of citizens‘ rights and the independent functioning of government. Two 
responses, 2.a corruption and red-tape and 2.d the influence of oligarchs on economic and 
political life, pertain to the ability of the state to freely reflect and pursue the interest of the 
greatest number of citizens, without the obstruction of greed-driven bureaucrats abusing 
their office or the undue interference of ultra-wealthy businessmen. A third, 2.d, democracy 
and human rights, is phrased very broadly to encompass a general set of civic and human 
rights common to democracies. The final option, 2.c ecology and environment, is not 
necessarily a liberal-democratic concern, but increasingly has become part of that value 
package in the Russian context. The environmental movement in Russia is strongly 
connected with issues of corruption and close ties between the state and big business, 
particularly the extractive industries. Both the state and business have repeatedly wreaked 
economic damage, at times illegally, with little regard to the impact on citizens‘ lives. These 
abuses of power have progressively become the focus of protest and civil society 
organization, which in some cases have become politicized, with Yevgenia Chirikova‘s 
crusade to stop the construction of a highway through the Khimki Forest as the most salient 
example. On a global level, environmental issues are increasingly discussed in the context of 
human rights, for example by the United Nations Environment Programme, which asserts 
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that the ―environment is a prerequisite to the enjoyment of human rights‖ and that 
environmental protection entails other rights, including access to information and to justice.  
 The third category addresses the state‘s ability to effectively deliver services, 
administer its programs, and guarantee the security of its people. Four responses address 
specific branches of government: 3.c the army, 3.d education, 3.e healthcare, and 3.f housing 
and utilities. Education and healthcare are almost entirely publicly administered; access to 
these services is guaranteed as a right in the Constitution. Similarly, housing and utilities are 
heavily administered by the state, though March 2013 will mark the conclusion of the 
twenty-year long program of housing privatization. Though subject to economic volatility, 
pensions are administered by the state and, following the monetization of benefits 
demonstrations in 2005, are very closely linked to state performance. Finally, the last 
response, terrorism, pertains to the state‘s ability to effectively keep its population safe from 
violent attack.  
In summary, our hypotheses are: 
(H.1) Economic issues since the global financial crisis have become an increasing 
concern for the urban, private-sector middle class, leading to protest activity. 
(H.2) The urban, private-sector middle class was becoming increasingly concerned 
about liberal and democratic issues leading up to the electoral cycle protests 
of 2011-2012.  
(H.3) Problems with the efficacy of the state were of increasing concern for the 
urban, private-sector middle class, which led to a drop in regime support 





I. The Economy and the Global Financial Crisis 
As president from 2000-2008, Putin presided over an economy that was undergoing 
considerable growth. As Russia emerged from the repeated devastating crashes and 
skyrocketing inequality of the 1990s, rising prices for oil and natural gas buoyed the 
economy. By 2008, incomes had risen by 250 percent, poverty and unemployment were 
falling, and Russia was one of the world‘s seven largest economies (Feklyunina and White, 
2011: 386). Inflation decreased from 100 percent in 1999 to 10 percent in 2006 (Rose and 
Mishler, 2010: 42). This growth was accompanied by increased foreign direct investment and 
increased embeddedness in the global financial system, particularly as oil and natural gas 
exports accounted for an ever-larger share of GDP. Though it is debatable how directly 
Putin‘s policies were responsible for this economic growth, the public tended to attribute it 
to him. Russians viewed economic development as the greatest achievement of Putin‘s first 
two terms in office, followed by higher living standards (Feklyunina and White, 2011: 386). 
Putin himself emphasized his economic successes, making promises of growth in GDP and 
salaries. 
When the global financial crisis hit Russia in October 2008, many of the economic 
gains of the previous decade were reversed. The centrality of energy exports to the Russian 
economy meant that it particularly susceptible to crises abroad. As oil prices fell, Russia‘s 
GDP plummeted by 13.5 percent, contracting at a rate below even that of 1998 (World Bank 
Development Indicators). The exchange rate fell, while inflation shot up by 5 percent, 
leading to a precipitous increase in the consumer price index (Rose and Mishler, 2010: 42; 
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World Bank Development Indicators). Workers faced unpaid wages and forced leave, and 
the unemployment rate nearly doubled between summer 2008 and March 2009 (Teague 
2011: 420). The crisis was reminiscent of the volatility and hardships the Russian population 
had endured in the 1990s, and came as a shock to a population increasingly accustomed to 
prosperity and growth (McAllister and White, 2011: 480). The shock, however, was relatively 
brief. By mid-2009, the government had managed to arrest the economy‘s decline. The 
recession ended a few months later, and, with the stabilization and increase in oil prices that 
accompanied the recovery worldwide, GDP growth returned to positive territory in 2010 
(Teague 2011: 421). 
Given that one of the pillars of Putin‘s popularity was economic growth and 
prosperity, there was considerable reason to believe that the economic crisis would have a 
deleterious effect on his support. Feklyunina and White (2011) have argued that support for 
the Putin regime stems almost exclusively from positive evaluations of the economy, or 
―performance legitimacy‖ (387). These evaluations are retrospective as well as prospective; 
thus any indication of the reversal of economic gains should trigger a deficit in regime 
legitimacy and a collapse in support. Economic issues frequently give rise to protest around 
the world, and in the past have correlated increased protest sentiment in Russia. McAllister 
and White (2011) have applied theories of economic voting to Russia to predict that people 
most affected by the financial crisis will withdraw support from the regime, particularly if 
there is clear attribution for the problem (482). Similarly citing the positive effect of 
economic growth on regime support, the severity of the crisis and the expectation that 
dissatisfied citizens will seek to replace their leader, Rose and Mishler (2010) assessed regime 
support using theories of economic voting, while considering factors external to economic 
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performance, including socialization and evaluations of regime political performance. Chaisty 
and Whitefield (2012) note that economic crises can give rise to protest when several 
preconditions are met, such as high income inequality, an inflexible non-democratic regime, 
and a resource-driven economy, all of which pertain in Russia (189). 
The 1998 economic crisis saw a spike in worker strikes, with future events also linked 
to economic concerns such as wage arrears (Robertson 2007: 784). Concerned over regime 
support, the Kremlin and political elites carefully orchestrated the public narrative about the 
crisis to deemphasize the leadership‘s responsibility. First employing a strategy of denial in 
early 2008, the Kremlin forbade the press from using the word krizis, and Finance Minister 
Aleksei Kudrin promised Russia would escape the crisis relatively unscathed (Feklyunina and 
White, 2011: 388). When, in Fall 2008, prominent economists Yevgenii Gontmakher and 
Igor Yurgens wrote editorials advocating for economic reform, forecasting anti-government 
riots and enjoining the public to demand civil rights in exchange for their economic losses, 
the Kremlin threatened to prosecute under the law against inciting extremism (Teague 2011: 
422). When the crisis became undeniable, threatening the Russian finance sector and 
reversing growth, the Kremlin deflected the focus from internal issues by blaming the West 
for its irresponsibility (Feklyunina and White, 2011: 389). The narrative that there were no 
domestic causes of Russia‘s troubles and that the Western capitalist model was dangerously 
flawed had a nationalist flair that played well in the political environment that followed the 
2008 war with Georgia (Feklyunina and White, 2011: 390). As the crisis progressed, the 
narrative shifted toward the more optimistic nationalism of multi-polarity: the world‘s 
economy was transforming, and Russia now had the opportunity to emerge as a global leader 
(Feklyunina and White, 2011: 394). The new Russia would be modernized, retrofitted for its 
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competitive, democratic future—a trade-off that justified a short period of economic 
hardship (Feklyunina and White, 2011: 401).  
Though the Kremlin may have had reason to be concerned that the economic crisis 
would trigger unrest, several studies have found that it had a minimal effect on regime 
support. Given Russia‘s recent history of economic upheaval, the population seemed more 
interested in ―hunker[ing] down and rid[ing] out the financial crisis as best they could‖ 
(Teague 2011: 422). Street demonstrations did not occur, and the incidence of strikes 
declined during the crisis, reversing a two-year trend (Teague 2011: 423). Positive evaluations 
of Putin‘s performance fell only slightly from 81 percent to 79 percent between June 2007 
and June 2009 (Rose and Mishler, 2010: 43). Neither survey respondents‘ negative feelings 
about their economic position, recent unemployment nor pessimistic expectations for the 
economic crisis had a negative affect on regime support, though wage arrears had a 
marginally significant affect (Rose and Mishler, 2010: 49, 52). These results have been 
interpreted as indicating that Russians have a sociotropic view of the economy, considering 
the health of the system overall before their personal circumstances.  
If evaluation of the economy appeared to be the only factor that correlated positively 
with regime support, we must also ask if Russians negatively evaluated the economy during 
the financial crisis. Several studies have found that they did not. Rose and Mishler (2010) 
attribute this finding to socialization: Russians viewed the crisis as a normal event in the 
economic development of a capitalist system, or an ―example of the erratic progress of the 
national economy,‖ which, despite its hardships, was preferable to the deprivations of the 
communist system (Rose and Mishler 2010: 53). Similarly, McAllister and White (2011) 
found that Russians did not feel the government was to blame for the crisis, nor was it able 
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to take initiative in the crisis‘s resolution beyond reacting to new developments (484). This 
ambivalence may indicate that Russians viewed the crisis as a part of a naturally occurring 
cycle in a capitalist system. Because the majority of Russians (40 percent) were unable to 
identify any domestic or foreign agent responsible for the financial crisis, it would seem that 
the leadership had successfully escaped blame (McAllister and White 486). It would thus 
appear that the rhetorical maneuverings choreographed by the Kremlin to blame the West, 
and recast the crisis as an opportunity were a success (Feklyunina and White, 211: 402). As 
the crisis subsided, it seemed that ―to the extent that democracy may be undermined in 
Russia, it will not be as a consequence of the economic crisis of 2008-9 and its aftermath‖ 
(McAllister and White, 2011: 492). 
A longer view of the effects of the crisis suggests that the threat might not have been 
so neatly neutralized. In 2009, several significant demonstrations were held, beginning with 
those held by car owners and importers in Vladivostok, who objected to protectionist tariff 
increase on imported cars. This protest culminated in demands that Putin remove himself as 
Prime Minister. Ultimately, the riot police were dispatched to end the demonstrations. In 
summer 2009, the workers‘ rallies were increasing, and protests in the single-factory town 
Pikalevo drew Putin‘s attention (Teague 2011: 423-4). January 2010 saw the largest 
demonstration since the fall of the Soviet Union, when 10,000 protestors in Kaliningrad 
rallied against unemployment, the rising cost of living and corruption and again demanded 
Putin‘s resignation (Teague 2011: 424). Protests continued through 2010 and increasingly 
encompassed non-economic demands, such as a halt to the construction of a highway 
through the Khimki forest outside of Moscow. FOM‘s protest sentiment indicator from 
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2010 to 2012 (figure 1.4) shows that negative assessments of the economic situation13 tend to 
be correlated with general protest sentiment14 in the country (FOM). 
Figure 1.4: Negative Assessment of Russian Economy, Protest Sentiment Index 
Source: FOM Indicators  
 
                                                 
13 Respondents selecting the most negative option for the questions, ―In your opinion, the current 
state of the Russian economy - good, fair or poor?‖ ―Do you think the state of the Russian economy 
over the past year has improved, worsened or did not change?‖ ―Do you think that in the next year 
the Russian economy will better, worse or unchanged?‖ 
(http://fom.ru/indikatory.html#?vt=37,47,128,161,164,185,113&s=125,140,121,117,128) 
14 FOM protest sentiment index is based on responses to five questions: In the last month did you 
notice or not notice dissatisfaction, or the willingness of people to participate in protests?; Do you 
think that in the last month, discontent or people's willingness to participate in protests has been 
growing or declining?; What percentage of Russians do you think are now discontent, or willing to 
participate in protests?; Do you personally feel or not feel resentment, or the willingness to 
participate in protests?; If next Sunday, where you live, there are rallies, demonstrations and protests, 
would you take part in them or not?. 
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 These studies on the financial crisis and regime support were conducted, however, 
before the electoral protests of 2011-2012, when there was relatively little protest activity in 
Russia. Were economic issues among the factors contributing to emergence of these 
protests? These protests were mainly comprised of participants with a middle class 
background, a distinction in part reflective of a specific financial circumstance. The middle 
class is expected to engage in long-term savings behavior or investment, making them more 
connected to global financial markets and therefore vulnerable to shocks and may have 
suffered greater losses. Further, they are much less dependent on the welfare state, so the 
state is less able to protect their well-being (Chaisty and Whitefield, 2012: 192). They may 
have thus experienced greater losses during the crisis and correspondingly decreased their 
support for the regime.  
Chaisty and Whitefield (2012) explored the possibility that the crisis impacted middle 
class evaluations of the regime using survey data gathered in 2009 of a randomized sample of 
1500 respondents from across the country. Using a binary logistic regression of factors 
influencing support for Medvedev or Putin in future elections, they found that although 
support for the regime decreased among individuals who were personally negatively affected 
by the crisis, there was no evidence that the crisis politicized the middle class more than the 
working class (196). This analysis does not take into account, however, significant 
differences in the impact of the financial crisis on the middle class as compared to the 
working class that might affect regime support. Given their financial behavior and 
professional backgrounds, members of the middle class likely experienced the crisis 
differently from members of the working class. While a factory worker might have suffered 
wage arrears and unemployment from work stoppages during the worst of the crisis, as 
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Russia‘s economy got back on track fairly quickly, these issues would also have been fairly 
quickly resolved. Comparatively, an entrepreneur with investments in foreign markets would 
be less likely to suffer from wage arrears or the closing of factories, but would be more likely 
to experience longer-term effects as the world‘s financial markets faltering recovery 
continued to impact investments and international business. For example, foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in Russia dropped from US$75 billion in 2008 to US$36.5 billion in 2009, 
and had only recovered to US$52.9 billion by 2011 (Worldbank Databank).15 While recovery 
in FDI has been steady following the crisis, by 2011, it had only just reached levels obtained 
in 2007. The slow recovery in FDI would be more likely to impact private sector employees 
with higher education and businessmen—two groups of the middle class of particular 
concern here—who might work for or do business with international firms, than state sector 
employees of a similar socio-economic position. Further, as the urban middle class exhibits 
more sophisticated and differentiated ways of managing their money, they were more likely 
to have been entangled in the global financial crisis and might be expected to report 
increased concerns about the economy at a later point in crisis (Ovcharova 33). Finally, 
members of the working class may be more likely to demand that the government meet 
specific short-term goals, like keeping a factory open, while the middle class might be more 
likely to expect the government to meet longer-term systemic goals, such as diversifying the 
economy or stemming inflation. Thus, looking at the changing attitudes of the middle class 
toward the economy in the several years following the crisis might reveal insights not 
available in studies conducted in the months immediately following.  
                                                 
15 See WorldBank Databank <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD>  
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 Finally, the notion that Russians as a whole did not know whom to blame for the 
crisis does not mean that the educated, urban middle class did not hold the government 
responsible. Once the crisis had penetrated Russia, the government‘s rhetoric of blame 
shifting and denial may have been seen by this group as deceitful, when viewed it in the 
broader context of the abuses of a paternalistic state (Aron, 2012: 27).  Finally, the promised 
modernization program to speed recovery may have particularly appealed to the middle 
class, who may have been disappointed when no such program was realized.  
 The economic issues hypothesis (H.1) is that the financial crisis and related on-going 
economic issues were becoming increasingly of concern to the urban middle class, leading 
up to the 2011 Duma election, and led to participation in the protests. We might expect the 
following specific results. Given their links to the global financial markets, the middle class 
concern about the economic crisis could have persisted longer than that of other classes and 
would not have abated in the summer of 2009, when the crisis in Russia ended. Given their 
professional background, they would not be significantly concerned about unemployment or 
delays in the payment of salaries, as compared with the general population. Inflation will 
likely be problematic for all levels of society as rising prices affects everyone, but the middle 
class, whose members might be less likely to live paycheck to paycheck, might feel the 
effects later as they increasingly dip into their savings. They may also be dismayed to find 
that their rubles do not stretch as far when they travel abroad. If Russians evaluate the 
economy based on their personal financial circumstances, rather than on their perception of 
the economy as a whole, then they should rate the standard of living of the population as 




II. Liberal Democratic Issues 
A second hypothesis (H.2) is that increasing interest in and concern about liberal-
democratic issues motivated political participation. After all, the protests demanded free and 
fair elections, one of the fundamental components of democracy, and took place around the 
Duma and presidential elections. Further, the strong negative reaction to the rokirovka, in 
which Putin seemed to condescendingly announce his return to the presidency as a foregone 
conclusion, suggested a rejection of paternalism and a shift toward a more participatory 
relationship with the state. It could therefore be possible that these protests were the 
outcome of rising interest in democracy, human rights, and a government motivated by 
state-building and concern for the citizens‘ best interests. However, if the protests were a 
manifestation of liberal-democratic concerns in the urban middle class, it would be a 
departure from the general trend in Russian society, as for the last two decades, Russians 
have had deeply conflicted ideas about democracy.    
Broadly speaking, Russians lack a clear concept of democracy and its implementation 
in Russia. To begin with, democracy as a political system itself is poorly understood. Values 
most commonly identified as democratic include economic prosperity, order and stability, 
and freedom of speech, press and religion. In a Western context only the latter is likely to be 
identified as democratic and the two former might occur in a variety of regime types.16 
Further, far more survey respondents selected these three values as emblematic of 
democracy than selected election of senior government officials. Perhaps because of this 
definitional confusion, there is little consensus as to whether democracy already exists in 





Russia and whether it should. A majority of the population continues to feel that Western 
democracy is unsuited to Russia (table 2.1), yet as of June 2010, 60 percent of respondents 
felt Russia needed democracy and 16 percent were unsure.17 In an October 2010 poll, only 
34 percent of people felt it was possible to describe Russia as a democratic state, while 19 
percent were not able to answer the question.18 The significant portion of survey 
respondents who were unable to form an opinion about Russian democracy speaks to a lack 
of clarity and ambivalence about the term.  
Table 2.1: In your opinion, to what extent is suitable for Russia "Western" (i.e., Western 




It is a universal form of social organization that is entirely suited to 
Russian conditions 
4% 6% 
It is a pattern of social organization that can be adapted to Russian 
conditions 
15% 20% 
It is not well suited to Russian conditions and is unlikely to take 
root in Russia 
31% 33% 
It is completely unsuited to Russian conditions and is contrary to 
the way of life of the Russian people 
37% 31% 
Difficult to answer 13% 11% 
Source: Levada Center <http://www.levada.ru/archive/gosudarstvo-i-obshchestvo/rossiya-
i-demokratiya/kak-vy-schitaete-v-kakoi-mere-dlya-rossii-po> 
 
 Why do Russians have such ambivalent attitudes toward democracy?19 Even twenty 
years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russians have limited experience with 





19 Scholars have argued that, in the 1990s, while some newly independent republics focused on 
implementing democratic governance as a rejection of the Soviet system, Russians never included 
democracy in their priorities for their new state. It was only when the Western democratic model 
appeared more economically successful that people began to support it (Petukhov and Ryabov, 2006: 
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democracy in the form of competitive political parties or fair elections. Free, fair and 
competitive elections have never truly determined the transition of executive power in 
Russia, as Yeltsin‘s reelection, Putin‘s early assumption of the presidency, and to a large 
extent Medvedev‘s election in the absence of competition were orchestrated by insider 
interests. Elections might better be described as facilitating the transfer of power from the 
incumbent to a pre-selected recipient (Dmitri Furman, quoted in Petukhov and Ryabov, 
285). The scope of political life has also been greatly reduced under Putin, who, in the 
interest of avoiding conflicts with parliament, has consolidated his power with the help of 
United Russia, the dominant party of power (Gill, 2012: 451).20 In this context, elections 
function more as a barometer for regime support than an opportunity to vote anyone into or 
out of office. As Russia‘s political sphere contracted, the concept of ―sovereign democracy‖ 
was developed by Kremlin ideologue Vladislav Surkov in 2006 to describe Russia‘s political 
                                                                                                                                                 
269-270). Insider privatization, the devaluation of the ruble and a sinking standard of living caused 
widespread disillusionment with democracy as implemented in the 1990s. Yeltsin did not prioritize 
the building of strong democratic institutions, a problem that culminated in the 1993 armed standoff 
with the Duma and a redrafting of the constitution that greatly shifted power toward the executive. 
At the end of the Yeltsin era, people associated upheaval with democracy and exhibited a strong 
preference for stability, even at the cost of their rights. In January 2000, 81 percent of Russians 
would rather have had ―order, even some violations of democratic principles and restriction of 
personal freedoms would be necessary to achieve it,‖ rather than democracy.19 In the next ten years 
this figure declined only moderately, to a 56 percent. 
20 Beginning in 2003, a United Russia-led parliament passing reforms that eliminated gubernatorial 
elections in favor of presidential appointment, toughened party registration legislation, prohibited of 
the formation of coalition parties and restructured the electoral system (Gelman, 2006: 552). These 
reforms drastically reduced the number of political parties, from 35 in 2004 to 6 in 2011, two of 
which held no Duma seats. Significant resources have been devoted to developing and maintaining 
popular support for United Russia, against which other parties cannot compete. 
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system (Surkov 2006).21 These factors have all contributed to ambivalent or negative public 
opinion on democracy in Russia in general. 
There is reason to believe, however, that this trend is changing course among the 
urban professional middle class. Firstly, many members of this group are relatively young, in 
their 20s and 30s, and were too young to be politically conscious in the 1990s. Instead, they 
became politically active when Putin was already in office and when Medvedev‘s election 
gave the appearance of political debate. They might thus be less likely than the general 
population to have negative associations with democracy. Still, young people remember the 
hardships of the Yeltsin-era economic crises, and so value the stability that Putin‘s leadership 
has purported to provide. They may thus have passively supported Putin while holding 
democratic values.   
Secondly, in the second half of the 2000s, the urban middle class exhibited increasing 
concerns over their ability to impact the political system. The study by Gudkov et al. (2009) 
indicated that the majority of well-off, young, private-sector professionals in major cities 
were not interested in politics and felt unable to impact the political system, while state-
sector employees were more likely to follow politics and feel that they could impact the 
system. Essentially, respondents who were ―ready today to be loyal to the authorities‖ were 
also ―able to take part in political life,‖ while those who were not loyal to the authorities, 
could not (47). This result might indicate that a lack of interest in politics reduces one‘s 
ability to impact politics, but it may also speak to a deeper estrangement from political life. 
                                                 
21 Developed as a response to Western pressures for the adoption of liberal policies, the doctrine of 
sovereign democracy almost tautologically argues that, in spite of various increasingly undemocratic 
policies, Russia is democratic because it practices a specific form of democracy that embodies the will 
of the people; it just happens to be a type of democracy that is less liberal—or less democratic—than 
the democracies of the West. 
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This survey group overall, regardless of sector and political involvement, found the most 
lacking feature of Russian politics was ―a controllable mechanism of political goal setting 
(the lack of transparency in the procedure of decision making), which is to say the 
suppression of any potential for legitimate innovations in society‖ (Gudkov et al. 2009: 47-
48). That a lack of transparency is seen as a critical problem for young, urban, well-off 
professionals suggests that a major need for political expression is going unaddressed. 
Moreover, this concern might be particularly strong in private-sector employees and people 
who are not interested in politics—the group that later joined the electoral protests.  
Additionally, the financial crisis may have had a secondary impact on attitudes 
toward the practice of democracy in Russia. Russians who experienced negative impacts of 
the financial crisis were not less likely to support the regime, but were less likely to positively 
evaluate democracy in Russia (Chaisty and Whitefield, 2012: 198).  This effect was notably 
stronger among private sector employees with a middle class background, as compared with 
state sector employees and those with a working class background. State employees with a 
middle class background who were not negatively impacted by the financial crisis were likely 
to offer positive evaluations of the regime, suggesting that there are developing divisions 
within the middle class (Chaisty and Whitefield, 2012: 200). Such a division is supported by 
the fact that the electoral protest movement was eventually comprised mainly of private 
sector employees from the middle class. Somewhat similarly, McAllister and White (2011) 
found that blaming Russian leadership for the financial crisis negatively impacted beliefs 
about democratic progress in Russia and assessments of the individual‘s ability to impact 
government (though they also found that Russians were likely to blame the crisis on 
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democracy itself, rather than on the regime in general and in particular did not find Putin 
responsible) (490). 
Finally, the two major proximate causes for the protests —the rokirovka and the 
fraudulent Duma elections—directly speak to issues of representative governance. The 
announcement of the rokirovka was negatively received in large part because it denied the 
public a choice in who would lead the country and appeared to confer on Putin the title of 
president months before the election. The urban middle class viewed the switch as an 
insulting rejection of democracy, suggesting that democracy itself might be of increasing 
importance to them. This anger at the rokirovka led to larger numbers of election monitors at 
the Duma elections, particularly in Moscow, again suggesting a rising interest in democratic 
values. Finally, the anger and frustration at thinly veiled fraud employed in the Duma 
election, particularly in Moscow, might also imply a more general frustration with and 
concern for the state of democracy in Russia.  
These shifts all give reason to believe that middle class Muscovites may have become 
increasingly concerned with issues of representative and transparent governance in recent 
years and would thus exhibit a greater concern for liberal-democratic issues leading up to the 
protests (H.2). The survey response ―democracy and human rights‖ explicitly addresses the 
issue of Western-style representative government. It also addresses human rights violations, 
and might respond to high profile human rights related issues, such as the prosecution and 
death in custody of lawyer Sergei Magnitsky.  
This hypothesis also uses three issues as proxies for concern about the political 
system and appropriate exercise of state power: (1) corruption and red tape, (2) the influence 
of oligarchs on political and economic life of the country, and (3) ecology and environmental 
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problems. The first two proxies, the influence of oligarchs on economic and political life and 
corruption and red tape, address alternative interests that divert officials from governing in 
the best interest of their citizens. Under Yeltsin, oligarchs exerted a tremendous influence on 
the developing state but had few interests beyond the advancement of their own wealth and 
power.22 Under Putin, the original oligarchs have been cowed—in exile, prison, or simply 
abstaining from politics—but they have been replaced with a political-business elite that has 
presented itself as a clan-like ―corporation,‖ running a kleptocratic state (Dawisha, 2011: 
335). When oligarchs insert themselves into the operations of the state, the interests of the 
broader public do not guide officials in their policy-making. Moreover, citizens might be 
concerned that the state is syphoning public funds into private hands; the prominent activist 
Alexey Navalny has presented ample evidence of this. An increasing concern about the 
influence of oligarchs suggests concern about the motivations and incentives of those 
running the country, and whether they are serving themselves and the ultra-elite, or serving 
the people.  
 The linked issue of corruption—the abuse of state power for personal gain—has 
become increasingly recognized as a pervasive problem, from the enrichment of high-level 
officials, who might benefit from the country‘s lucrative natural resources, to low-level 
bribery at the hands of state employees including doctors, teachers, building inspectors and 
law enforcement. When officials work to exploit state resources as well as individuals for 
private gain, they are likely not governing with the best interest of the populace at heart. 
Although a significant share of Russians feel that high-level officials are corrupt, they in large 
                                                 
22 The privatizations that created the oligarchs also created deep inequalities in society that inhibited 
the development of a middle class, which might have taken a more active role in politics; inequality in 
Russia remains a serious problem today (Petukhov and Ryabov, 2006: 284). 
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part view corruption as a norm, and have not historically rated it highly as an issue of 
concern (Sharafutdinova, 2010: 147). Nonetheless, corruption received a great deal of 
attention under Medvedev, who launched a sweeping anti-corruption campaign in 2008 that 
included a variety of reforms and had support from Putin.23 The campaign yielded little 
result, according to Transparency International‘s Corruption Perceptions Index, which 
ranked Russia 143 out of 180 countries in 2007; in 2011, it ranked 143 out of 182 countries. 
Corruption is likely to be a particular concern in Moscow, where citizens consume a wider 
range of media in independent publications and online, and are thus more likely to be aware 
of corruption.24 Moreover, entrepreneurs and private-sector employees are more likely to be 
the losers in corrupt transactions, paying bribes to state employees for building permits, fire 
inspections and other interactions with the state that private enterprise necessitates. Finally, 
as more members of the urban professional middle class increasingly identify with the West 
and the international urban lifestyle—manifested, for example, in the attempted replication 
of New York or London lifestyle in Moscow, or greater interest in emigration—they view 
bribery and corruption as increasingly backward, anti-Western, and an obstruction to the 
lifestyle they aspire to. 
Finally, the third proxy, ecology and environmentalism, is an issue that has become 
increasingly politicized after being the object of a great deal of attention by newly-formed 
and older, glasnost’-era civil society groups. Environmental degradation and destruction, 
                                                 
23 Anti-corruption campaigns themselves can have negative effects on corruption perceptions as well 
as on attitudes toward the state. Coulloudon (2002) suggests that where regimes are characterized by 
institutionalized corruption, anti-corruption campaigns can simply raise awareness of the problem, 
essentially demonstrating the state‘s inability to fight address the problem and contributing to 
impressions of state weakness (188). 
24 See Sharafutdinova (2010: 156) on factors affecting corruption perception in hybrid regimes.  
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particularly in major cities, have become symbols of the abuse of state power and lack of 
consideration for the law as well as citizens‘ rights (Aron, 2012: 26). Two of the best-known 
causes are the on-going fight to prevent the destruction of the Khimki forest to 
accommodate a highway between Moscow and St. Petersburg, led by popular opposition 
figure Evgeniya Chirikova and ECMO, and the successful campaign to prevent Gazprom 
from erecting a massive new office building in St. Petersburg in spite of city ordinances that 
prevent the construction of buildings that would alter the city‘s historic skyline. A central 
complaint is the collusion of business interests and the state; Chirikova has said, ―we have 
people in power whose sole goal is personal enrichment at the country‘s expense‖ (Aron, 
2012: 26). These movements have demanded the equal enforcement of the law, called upon 
citizens to express their interests by voting and even insisted that Putin remove himself from 
office. These urban environmental movements can also be seen as responses to economic 
growth, wherein the public struggles to have a say in the consequences of development of its 
surroundings (Robertson, 2013). Finally, it can also be seen as related to the increasing 
interest in urbanism among the professional middle class of the major cities. Urbanism—or, 
the improvement in urban living conditions, with Western European cities as a goal—has 
manifested in environmental concerns, such as the interest in parks development in Moscow 
and bicycling in St. Petersburg. Urbanism has also been expressed more politically as a 
theory of small deeds, or working for smaller, actionable improvements that have an 
immediate impact on living standards, rather than abstract political goals that are all but 
impossible to realize. Thus, all three problems can be viewed as proxies for democracy in 
that they can all indicate an increasing demand for representation, for the elimination of 
alternative interests, and for an end to the exploitative use of the state for private gain.   
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III. State Efficacy 
A third hypothesis (H.3) posits that the middle class was not satisfied with how the 
state was accomplishing the work of governing, in how it keeps citizens safe and administers 
essential social service sectors, and as a result, stopped supporting the regime and 
participated in the protests. If support for the Putin regime is, in fact, based on performance 
legitimacy, assessments of that performance may not be confined to the economic sphere, as 
earlier suggested. Rather, such assessments could also include considerations of service 
provision, particularly in a post-communist context where the legacy of the Soviet welfare 
state remains strong. The problems in this category specifically address pensions, the army, 
education, healthcare, and housing and utility sectors of the government, and terrorism.  
Service delivery includes both continual (for example, the on-going receipt of a 
pension) and instantiated (for example, visiting a state doctor) interactions with the state, and 
as such constitutes a major avenue by which citizens interact with the state. In administering 
services, the state has a series of opportunities to meet or fail to meet citizens‘ needs. That 
success or failure can take a variety of forms, depending on the situation and the citizens‘ 
expectations. Higher expectations are likely to lead to greater disappointment with state 
performance. Effective, high-quality and well-administered services, one might imagine, 
would lead to greater satisfaction with the state.  Likewise, when services are poorly 
administered, frustration and dissatisfaction with the state could easily arise. There is reason 
to believe that the middle class is dissatisfied with social services, as economic growth has 
raised living standards, but social services remain of poor quality or prohibitively expensive; 
their expectations are thus not being met by the state (Gorshkov, 2008: 65). 
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The primary avenues of service delivery addressed here are pensions, education, 
healthcare, and housing, all of which are fully or partially administered by the state. Of these, 
pensions have long been the most controversial. State-administered pensions have been a 
sensitive issue since the fall of the Soviet Union, as the dissolution of the social safety net 
and repeated financial crises have left the elderly impoverished. During Putin‘s first terms as 
president, a highly unpopular proposal to convert in-kind welfare benefits to cash transfers 
led to high-profile, sustained protests around the country, organized by pensioners 
themselves, who expected the state would look after them as the Soviet Union did. These 
protests were the largest coordinated protest actions seen under Putin, and they ultimately 
compelled the Kremlin to reconfigure the program, though benefits were in large part 
monetized. The monetization scheme and attendant protests depressed Putin‘s popularity to 
its lowest rating since he took office. The alarm with which the protests were received also 
demonstrated the difficulty with which the highly centralized regime managed unrest 
(Chaisty and Whitefield, 2012: 189). Though pensions have been controversial, they are less 
likely to be a concern of the urban professional middle class, who generally skew somewhat 
younger, are more likely to exhibit long-term savings behavior, and have higher incomes. 
Education, on the other hand, is likely to be a concern of the middle class, as they 
value education and have pursued advanced degrees. Though Russia is the best-educated 
country in the world, the quality of education has been decreasing in recent years. According 
to the Times of Higher Education, Moscow State University, commonly called the best 
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university in the country, ranked 50th in the world in 2013, down from 33rd in 2011.25 
Corruption is widespread at the university level, where an informal market has encroached 
upon the meritocratic goals of an educational system. Admission, grades and even diplomas 
might be up for sale. Duma deputies and other notables have been discovered to have 
plagiarized their dissertations (Lipman 2013). Such an environment undermines the 
meritocratic objectives of education with pure self-advancement. One of the most common 
places to encounter corruption in education is at the preschool level, where parents are 
forced to pay for spots for their children (Rimsky 2012). Private education remains 
uncommon, so for the majority of a younger demographic likely to have small children, this 
bribery is likely to be a concern. Accordingly, 63 percent of the urban professional middle 
class is interested in sending their children abroad for school, and 35 percent would want 
their children to permanently emigrate (Gudkov et al. 2008: 50). 
 Similarly, state-administered healthcare is rife with shortcomings. Services are 
ostensibly free or highly subsidized by the state, but the paltry salaries that doctors and 
medical professionals earn have created a significant market for bribery and opportunity for 
corruption. Medical services are delivered at costs determined by the doctor, when their cost 
should be determined by set rates or be free of charge. Services are of low quality, yet private 
clinics are expensive and out of reach for the average family.  
One might expect residents of the major cities, Moscow and St. Petersburg, to have 
complaints about housing; as with any big city, apartments are always too small, too remote 
and too expensive. In Russia, however, the state continues to be deeply involved in the 
                                                 





administration of housing, via Housing Services (Zhilishchno-kommunal‘niye Uslugi, or 
ZhKU) and Housing and Public Utilities (Zhilishchno-kommunal‘noye Khozyaistvo, or 
ZhKKh), which attends to issues such as building maintenance and setting utilities rates. A 
massive post-Soviet campaign to privatize housing began in the early 1990s. While the 
majority of housing stock was privatized very quickly, the privatization program only 
concluded in March 2013, after a five-year extension on applications in 2008, due to a variety 
of complications. Post-Soviet housing privatization has made 85 percent of the population 
homeowners, including those who might not have otherwise had the funds to do so 
(Shomina, quoted in Attwood, 2012: 1).26 This process in part aimed to expand the middle 
class and increase the number of ―stakeholders‖ in Russian society (Attwood 2012: 904). In 
reality, housing and utilities have become a controversial issue, as the privatization process 
underscored inequalities and tax issues, the rising cost of state-regulated utilities spawned 
demonstrations, and neglect has led to the degradation of housing stock (Attwood 2012: 
908). The housing sector has been called the most corrupt by government officials, in part 
because the potential profits are massive, particularly in major cities, even occasionally giving 
rise to violence, as in 2011 when the mayor of Sergiev Posad was murdered for investigating 
corruption related to housing and utilities (New York Times, 18 February 2013; The Moscow 
Times, 22 August 2011). For the upwardly-mobile, urban professionals in question, housing is 
likely to be a sensitive concern; as their position improves, they are likely to seek better 
housing, which is in short supply in major cities.  
                                                 
26 In general, home ownership is viewed as a characteristic of the middle class; for example, mortgage 
rates have been used as a barometer for the growth of the middle class in the United States. This is 
not the case in Russia, as housing privitazations have made a significant portion of the population 
homeowners at little or no cost.  
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Beyond service delivery, the state must be effective in keeping its people safe, here 
measured in concerns about the army and terrorism. For a state and population who proudly 
remember past Soviet military triumphs and identify a strong state with a strong military, the 
condition of the armed forces is a paramount concern and is deeply tied with the image of 
the state. Putin has vowed that he will modernize the Russian military and in his 2012 
campaign speeches, promised to devote a staggering $770 billion its improvement over ten 
years (Iosebashvili 2012). However the military has faced significant deterioration in the last 
decades, suffering from outdated technology and poorly implemented funding. Most 
significantly, problems with the military have been well publicized since 1989 by one of the 
oldest and best-organized civil society groups, The Union of the Committees of Soldiers' 
Mothers of Russia. This group advocates for reform and draws attention to the significant 
abuses that pervade the armed forces, such as extreme hazing, even resulting in death; 
malnourishment of recruits; corruption, and a variety of other offenses, for example leaving 
behind the bodies of deceased soldiers and declaring them missing rather than dead (see 
Zdravomyslova 2007). These issues are of even greater concern because Russia has 
mandatory military service, meaning that young men are often exposed to these abuses. The 
inability of the state to manage the military to prevent abuses and to safely enlist young 
recruits is a major problem. There are a variety of possible exemptions to the mandatory 
service, including enrollment in university, and it is also possible to pay one‘s way out. The 
urban professional middle class takes advantage of these exemptions to avoid serving. The 
efficaciousness of the military might also be in doubt given its inability to stabilize Chechnya, 
though given the complexity of the situation in Chechnya, that failure is less likely to be 
attributed to the army.  
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Similarly, terrorism poses a serious problem, in that repeated terrorist attacks might 
demonstrate that the state is not able to maintain its own borders or monitor and prevent 
domestic terrorism, with the goal of keeping citizens safe. There have been a series of 
terrorist attacks in Russia, mainly since the initiation of the Chechen Wars, including the 
Nord-Ost Siege in Moscow in 2002, and the Beslan crisis in 2004. Most relevant for this 
study are the three major attacks occurred in and around Moscow between 2008 and 2011: 
the derailment of the Nevsky Express train between Moscow and St. Petersburg in 
November 2009, the Moscow metro suicide bombings in March 2010, and the 
Domodedovo airport bombing in January 2011. This relatively high incidence of terrorism in 
the capital might cause alarm and lead citizens to believe that the state is struggling to fulfill 
its primary responsibility of law, order and safety. However it is possible that citizens would 
not attribute terrorism to the state, but rather to the terrorists. It is also possible that 
terrorism would be of greater concern immediately after an attack, but would not remain a 
high priority once that memory fades. 
Regarding all state efficacy concerns, with the exception of terrorism, one might 
expect the emergence of civil society groups to advocate for citizens‘ rights and interests that 
might encourage the state to reform these sectors. This has occurred in limited ways, as in 
the case of the military and environmental activism against the destruction of the Khimki 
forest (discussed above) but broadly speaking, civil society remains weak in Russia, in part 
because of legal constraints. Citizens rarely feel empowered to form or join civil society 
organizations. For many, the memory of compulsory participation under the Soviet system is 
still alive, while others simply feel it is not worth the time, money, energy and at times 
personal risk, when the results are unlikely to be significant. In the absence of electoral 
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accountability and without civil society, administrative decisions can appear arbitrary, and 
citizens have few avenues to express their dissatisfaction. With frustrations increasing, 
citizens are more likely to resort more extreme ways of communicating their dissatisfaction, 
which can give rise to protests, like the 2005 pension benefits protests.  
While the urban professional middle class can financially insulate itself from 
mandatory military service and are not yet old enough for pensions, they cannot escape the 
systemic problems of the education, health and housing sectors. Though they may be able to 
operate independently of the state in other aspects of life—the culture they consume, or the 
private-sector jobs they hold—in these three respects, the state and its sub-par, often corrupt 
services are inescapable. It is thus likely that education, healthcare and housing would be of 




These hypotheses will be assessed using responses to the survey question, ―Which of 
the following problems do you consider most important for the country as a whole?‖. This 
question was asked of a 1600-person representative sample of the Russian population by the 
Russian Public Opinion Research Center (WCIOM). Due to lack of access to raw data, it 
was not possible to fully isolate the responses of middle class members in Moscow. Instead, 
we can look separately at the responses of groups exhibiting single characteristics of the 
urban middle class. The following analysis is based on analysis of the answers of respondents 
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in the following groups: 
- Education: respondents with higher education (at least three years of university, or 
completed university degree); 
- Vocation: respondents working as businessmen or entrepreneurs; specialist with 
higher education in manufacturing, science or culture, not including state employees; 
- Income: respondents with income of 50,00027 rubles or higher per family member per 
month; 
- Purchasing Power: respondents who can easily purchase medium-priced consumer 
durables (refrigerator, TV); respondents who can easily purchase expensive 
consumer durables (car, dacha, apartment); 
- Location: respondents from Moscow and St. Petersburg.  
There is a significant caveat to this data, in that we cannot integrate these various middle 
class criteria to create an ideal urban middle class respondent. These groups must be 
considered separately. Thus, for example, when we consider the answers of people with 
higher education, we are looking at people across the country, in all professional sectors, in 
all income levels, who have higher education. Despite these limitations, this survey data will 
allow us to look at how these groups‘ attitudes towards problems have changed over time.28  
This section begins with an overview of salient findings. The following analysis then 
assesses problems that were of increasing concern between March 2008 and March 2012. It 
                                                 
27 Approximately US$1,575. 
28 This study only uses rounds of the survey conducted between 2008 and 2011 for which sufficient 
information about the sample was available to isolate middle class groups: March 23, 2008; January 
11, 2009; September 11, 2010; January 16, 2011; April 10, 2011; June 26, 2011; November 27, 2011; 
December 25, 2011; March 25, 2012.  
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then considers the relative levels of concern for problems classified pertaining to each 
hypothesis, and compares the middle class groups and residents of Moscow and St. 
Petersburg to the general population. The section concludes with a comparison to another 
data set collected by Graeme Robertson, in which members of the middle class were asked, 
―Which of the following are the most important problems facing Russia today?‖ This survey 
was conducted online in late February and early March 2012. The possible responses are 
phrased differently than the options in the WCIOM survey, but are roughly equivalent. I will 
then compare the responses of groups exhibiting single characteristics of the urban middle 
class from the WCIOM survey, to those of Robertson‘s respondents, who were selected 
specifically for middle class status. Robertson‘s data set will allow inferences about 
motivations behind participation in electoral cycle protests, as these participants are isolated 
in the data. 
 
II. Findings 
Analysis indicated that problems pertaining to all three hypotheses were of increasing 
concern for middle class groups, as well as for the general population, between March 2008 
and March 2012. Rather than any one of these categories motivating an increase in 
dissatisfaction with the state, the interplay between them might have led to that result. For 
example, dissatisfaction with quality of life or the pervasiveness of corruption may tie these 
issues together.  
Among economic issues, the standard of living of the population saw the greatest 
increase in concern over this period. The increase was greatest among residents of Moscow 
48 
 
and St. Petersburg. Of democratic issues, corruption increased most over the period in 
question. In this same category, democracy and human rights was among the lowest-rated 
problems in the whole survey. Evidence from Moscow and St. Petersburg, however, 
suggests that interest in this issue is dependent on the electoral cycle and on current events. 
Among state efficacy issues, worries about housing, healthcare and education were 
increasing, implying dissatisfaction with the state‘s ability to provide basic social services.  
Generally, concerns of the middle class did not deviate significantly from the 
concerns of the general population. This result might suggest that, despite variation in socio-
economic position, members of the middle class do not have priorities that are 
fundamentally different from those of an average Russian. The difference is more of degree 
of concern than in kind of concern. This is particularly true of residents of Moscow and St. 
Petersburg, who were the most critical of the state of any group considered here. This result 
suggests that residence in the capitals, rather than membership in the middle class, is more 
likely to make one critical or demanding of the state. 
 
III. A Constellation of Problems 
 Issues that were becoming increasingly important in the lead-up to the December 
2011 protests included economic, democratic and state efficacy concerns (table 3.1).29 The 
problems that had the greatest increase in importance from March 2008 to March 2012 were 
(1) the standard of living of the population; (2) corruption and red tape; (3) the situation in 
                                                 
29 Social problems (alcoholism and drug abuse; crime; youth development; morality and ethics and 
demographic crisis) were generally of high concern to middle class groups as well as the general 
population, yet they exhibited little change over the time period in question. 
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the housing and utilities sector; (4) the situation in the healthcare sector; (5) the situation in 
the education sector; and (6) the influence of oligarchs on the economic and political life of 
the country.  
Table 3.1: Issues of Increasing Overall Importance to Middle Class Groups in Russia 
Issue Type of Issue 
Standard of living of the 
population 
Economic 
Corruption and red tape Democratic 
Housing and utilities State Efficacy 
Healthcare State Efficacy 
Education State Efficacy 
Influence of Oligarchs Democratic 
 
 Firstly, these results indicate that middle class groups are increasingly concerned for 
their quality of life. Their most important issue in general was the standard of living, an 
economic concern. Moreover the phrasing of this survey option as ―the standard of living of 
the population‖ indicates that it is a sociotropic issue for society at large, rather than a 
personal concern. Increasing worry over the state of the housing, health and education 
sectors refers back to the standard of living.  
Given that the standard of living has risen over the last decade in Russia, it might be 
possible that this frustration is the result of higher expectations. As the urban middle class 
has accumulated wealth, it has increasingly been exposed to the Western European and 
American lifestyle via travel abroad and foreign media. Young urban professionals seek 
membership in the Western, urban elite culture with which they identify, as exemplified by 
the general post-Soviet predilection for conspicuous consumption and by the current mania 
for iPhones and iPads. Increasingly in Moscow and St. Petersburg, the young professional 
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middle class has isolated itself from the so-called average Russian, in their own restaurants, 
coffee shops and bars, many of which are London, Brooklyn or Paris-themed. It is common 
to hear successful young people in Moscow talk longingly about moving abroad, so that they 
can finally live in a normal country where everything works as it should.  This obsession with 
the West and ability to insulate themselves from the dominant culture may have aggravated 
these concerns about quality of life, in that their expectations and ideals are consistently 
disappointed. 
 Additionally, as urban professionals are more successful, they are likely to expect that 
their greater earnings would increase their quality of life. Certainly a higher income does 
improve quality of life, but when services are state-administered, as with education and 
healthcare, having more money does not necessarily mean access to better quality. For 
example, all institutions of higher education in Russia are public, and thus subject to the 
myriad problems that any state agency faces—corruption, mismanagement, political 
manipulation and so on. In the US, it is common for families from the middle class and 
higher to send their children to private universities, where their ability to pay for an 
education allows them to avoid the problems of a public university and ensures their 
children the college experience of their choosing and in many cases a higher quality 
education. In Russia, by contrast, it is not possible to opt out of this system without the 
considerable financial wherewithal and aptitude to go abroad for university. Thus for an 
upper-middle class family, having more money might result in higher expectations, but does 
not necessarily result in a better services.  
Another possible connection might be corruption, as the housing, health and 
education sectors have all been impacted by corruption, which is itself the second most 
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important concern for this group. Corruption became a high-profile problem following the 
announcement of Medvedev‘s anti-corruption campaign, as discussed below. It is therefore 
possible that, as corruption became a national issue of high visibility, people began to see it 
more frequently in their daily lives. Greater concern for the role of oligarchs, however, 
suggests that this concern was not limited to the quotidian, but was also leveled at the higher 
echelons of business and government.  
 Finally, these results imply that if there was a social contract between Putin and the 
middle class, there were deep fractures in it before the outbreak of the electoral cycle 
protests, particularly in Moscow and St. Petersburg. If the social contract guaranteed 
improved living standards, these results indicate that those for whom living standards were 
most improved—the middle class—felt that this issue was not only unresolved, but 
increasingly problematic. Likewise, the social contract might have guaranteed a certain 
standard of living, but when major services administered by the government are of poor or 
decreasing quality, and might no longer allow you access to a good education, suitable 
housing or reliable healthcare, it might be difficult to see how the government is upholding 
its end of the contract. The social contract might have guaranteed that the state would stay 
out of your life as long as you stayed out of politics, but if corruption increasingly penetrates 
public services, as well as your personal and professional life, it might be easy to see that as 
government intrusion with little benefit.   
 
 
IV. Economic Issues 
Respondents with higher education, those working in the specialized private sector, 
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those earning over 50,000 rubles per month, and those able to purchase moderately priced 
or expensive durables ranked the economic problems in the following order: (1) Inflation, 
rising prices for goods and services; (2) the standard of living of the population; (3) 
unemployment; (4) economic crisis; and (5) delays in payments of salaries. These concerns 
are represented in figure 3.1, using specialized private sector employees, businessmen and 
entrepreneurs as a representative example.  
  
These rankings were the same for the general population.  
For Moscow and St. Petersburg residents, inflation was a critical concern for 
approximately two years following the financial crisis, until it was supplanted by worries 




































































































































































Figure 3.1: Simplified Economic Issues for Specialized Private Sector Employees, 




Though still considered a significant problem, inflation has been a declining concern 
across all groups between March 2008 and March 2012; even as the financial crisis played 
out, worries about inflation continually declined. Over that same period, concern for the 
standard of living has been steadily increasing. Significantly, in June 2011 and November 
2011, concern for inflation was at an all-time low, while concern the standard of living was at 
a high, particularly in Moscow and St. Petersburg, where 56 percent of respondents selected 
it as a concern.  
Concern for the standard of living significantly increased between December 2011 
and March 2012, roughly corresponding to the period of the electoral cycle. Indeed, this 




















































































Figure 3.2: Concerns about Inflation and Standard of  Living, Residents of  Moscow 







of people selected the standard of living as a problem, and by March 2012, 71 percent felt it 
was an issue.  
Also noteworthy here is concern for the economic crisis.  This option was first 
available in the January 2009 round of the survey, at which time it was of significantly higher 
interest to respondents from middle class groups as compared to the general public. While 
23 percent of the general public felt the economic crisis was a problem, 32 percent of 
residents in Moscow and St. Petersburg and 30 percent of respondents with higher 
purchasing power selected it in January 2009. While these figures seem low considering the 
scope of the global financial crisis, they demonstrate that different groups perceived this 
event differently. Concern for the economic crisis declined until June 2011, when it again 
became a critical concern, garnering slightly more than 30 percent of responses in all groups, 
including the general public—an increase of approximately 20 percentage points over the 
previous round of surveys in April 2011.  
Finally, worry about unemployment and delays in the payment of salaries were both 
generally decreasing over this period. Unemployment was a more serious problem for the 
general population than for the respondents from these groups, particularly residents of 
major cities. Delays in the payment of salaries were a marginal concern for respondents by 
2011, and similarly, this issue was less important for respondents from these groups than for 
the general population.  
 
V. Democratic Issues 
All groups, including the general population, ranked the most important democratic 
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issues as (1) corruption and red tape; (2) influence of oligarchs on the economic and political 
life; ecology and the environment; and (3) democracy and human rights (figure 3.3). 
 
For all groups, concern for corruption is significant and increasing. Middle class 
groups were more likely than the general population to select corruption as a problem. It was 
of greatest concern to residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg and specialized private sector 
employees. Though corruption is a highly-rated problem on all surveys, it becomes a much 
greater concern in December 2011. Before December 2011, concern for corruption was high 
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Figure 3.3: Simplified Democratic Issues for Respondents with Medium and High 





The spike in concern for corruption in December 2011 was not presaged by a rising interest 
in the issue. Instead, concern for corruption first manifested between the March 2008 and 
January 2009 rounds of the survey. The May 2008 announcement of Medvedev‘s anti-
corruption campaign and the programs initiated to mitigate corruption throughout the year 
are likely responsible for the interest. The announcement of the anti-corruption campaign 
increased concern in corruption to a similar degree that the Duma elections did; both events 
led to an increase of approximately 15 percentage points across all groups.   
Democracy and human rights was the lowest-rated concern not only of the 
democratic issues, but was one of the least important of the survey as a whole. Interest in 
democracy and human rights consistently decreased over the period of the survey for middle 




























































































approximately 25 percent of respondents from the middle class groups and 19 percent of the 
general population were concerned about democracy and human rights, only 7-11 percent of 
people were typically concerned with this issue by November 2011. Concern was marginally 
higher for members of the middle class groups as compared with the general population, but 
not significantly.  
For residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg, however, the story is slightly different. 
Concern about democracy and human rights appears linked to the electoral cycle protests. 
For these respondents, concerns about democracy and human rights reached a low point of 
8 percent in April 2011, but then increased to 15 percent by June 2011, to a high point of 29 
percent in December 2011, following the fraudulent Duma election (figure 3.5).  
 
This result suggests that, although democracy and human rights were not an issue of great 






























It also indicates that the priority of democracy and human rights is subject to current 
events. Though residents of the capital might not view their daily lives in the context of 
these issues, they are nonetheless able to use them as frameworks for understanding major 
events, like elections. It would thus seem that the lack of interest in democracy and human 
rights is not based on a misunderstanding of or unfamiliarity with the terms, but perhaps by 
the feeling that these concepts are not applicable to every situation or problem with the 
state.  
Despite the surge in interest in democracy and human rights in late 2011, by March 
2012 after Putin‘s victory in the presidential elections, only 8 percent of respondents in 
Moscow and St. Petersburg selected this issue. This finding implies that concern for 
democracy and human rights might be linked to a sense of personal political efficacy. 
Following the Duma elections, protestors called for the invalidation of the election results, 
and sought to prevent Putin‘s reelection in March. Both activities might have led to an 
increase in concern for democracy, but neither aim was successfully achieved. Putin‘s 
reelection was perceived as a failure and deep disappointment for the protest movement. 
The failure to create democratic change appears to have translated to apathy, rather than on-
going concern. If we feel, however, that the importance of democracy and human rights is 
contingent on a relevant event, this drop-off in interest might be the result of the conclusion 
of the federal electoral cycle. In other words, if elections lead to an increased interest in 
democracy, when significant elections are far off, we might expect interest in democracy to 
decline. We might similarly expect interest to pick up around the next major election, 
perhaps the upcoming elections for Moscow mayor and city council. 
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Concern about the influence of oligarchs is slightly higher for the middle class 
groups than for the general population, and significantly higher for residents of Moscow and 
St. Petersburg. All groups became more concerned about this issue in the November 2011 
survey, exhibiting a 6-14 percentage point increase between June 2011 and November 2011, 
while concern among the general population in this period increased only 4 percentage 
points, from 19 percent to 23 percent. That effect was again strongest in Moscow and St. 
Petersburg, where concern increased from 24 percent to 38 percent. This increase may have 
been a response to the announcement that Putin would run for president rather than 
Medvedev, which implied at least backroom dealing, if not the influence of oligarchs. It also 
coincided with oligarch Mikhail Prokhorov‘s public announcement in September 2011 that 
he would depart from the Pravoe Delo political party, a satellite party of power in which he 
had been a prominent figure. In doing so, he publicly called the party a ―farce‖ controlled by 
―puppet master‖ from the Kremlin, Vladislav Surkov (New York Times, Sept. 15 2011). These 
two episodes likely highlighted the role of informal power in Russia‘s political system. 
Concerns about ecology and the environment peaked in March 2008 and reached a 
low point in January 2009, suggesting that the financial crisis led people to temporarily 
abandon non-essential interests or activities. Consistent with expectations, interest in ecology 
and the environment among the middle class groups is slightly, though not significantly, 
higher than that of the general population.  
 
VI. State Efficacy  
 Of issues related to state efficacy, results were again roughly the same across middle 
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class groups, with slight variations in responses from residents of Moscow and St. 
Petersburg, and the general population. Middle class groups, except residents of Moscow 
and St. Petersburg, felt the most important issues were (1) the situation in the sphere of 
housing and utility services; (2) the situation in the health sector; (3) the situation in the 
education sector; pension benefits; (4) terrorism; and (5) the situation in the army (figure 
3.6).
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bigger concern than education (figure 3.7). 
 
Despite some variation, several common trends are apparent here. Three main 
issues—education, healthcare and housing and utilities—were consistently of increasing 
concern for middle class groups as well as the general population over this time period. The 
prominence of these issues may be linked with a greater concern for the provision or poor 
quality of state services. Alternately, it could reflect a concern with the costs of these 


















































































































































































































increasing; this explanation might best apply to housing and utilities. By far the biggest issue 
in state efficacy—as well as one of the most significant in the survey as a whole—was the 
situation with housing and utilities. Beginning in January 2011, all groups and the general 
population greatly increased their concern about housing and utilities. It went from an issue 
that about 25 percent of people cared about in September 2010 to an issue for about 50 
percent of people in January 2011. It thereafter remained approximately constant. 
Concern for the healthcare sector also increased over the period in question, at a 
similar rate across middle class groups and the general population. Moreover, healthcare was 
a concern for a nearly identical share of respondents from middle class group by higher 
education, private sector professionals, and those earning 50,000 rubles per month, and the 
general population. Respondents from Moscow and St. Petersburg assessed healthcare much 
more negatively than other groups beginning in April 2011. At that time, all groups increased 
their negative evaluations of the healthcare sector, but the increase was greatest for residents 
of the capital cities, for whom concern about healthcare increased by 22 percentage points to 
50 percent.  
Education exhibited the weakest increase of the three, increasing around ten 
percentage points for all groups between January 2009 and March 2012. Of all middle class 
groups and the general population, education was most of concern to respondents with 
higher education and private sector professionals with higher education, which is in line with 
expectations. It was of least concern to residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg, of all 
groups. 
Worries about terrorism generally decreased over the time period. Middle class 
groups, except residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg, selected terrorism as a problem as 
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frequently as the general population did. As might be expected, given that terrorism outside 
of the Caucasus is concentrated in Moscow, residents of the capitals were more concerned 
about this issue than others. Concern for terrorism seems responsive to terrorist events, 
rather than perceptions of the state.  
The importance of the payment of pensions was fairly volatile for all groups, but 
there was virtually no net increase or decrease over the period, suggesting that the issue of 
pensions will continue to be controversial but might be unlikely to cause enduring 
dissatisfaction.  
The army was of low but consistent concern for all groups including the general 
population, with one notable exception. In Moscow and St. Petersburg, the army became a 
concern beginning in June 2011, when 23 percent of people selected it as an issue—a 16-
percentage point increase over the previous survey.  
 
VII. The Middle Class Compared to the General Population 
 Across all surveys, responses from the middle class groups as defined by educational 
level, vocation, purchasing power and income were roughly consistent. Responses from 
these groups tended to rise and fall in a similar pattern and to a similar degree. This might 
suggest that a set of coherent attitudes exists within the middle class, but further analysis 
with more detailed data is needed to confirm this hypothesis.  
In fact, the concerns of the middle class groups and the concerns of the general 
population were not very different. Table 3.2 ranks issues that were of increasing concern 
between March 2008 and March 2012. The four issues that have become a bigger concern 
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for the general population—corruption, housing, the standard of living and healthcare—are 
also the top four issues that are becoming of greater concern for these middle class groups. 
Essentially, the main problems that concern members of the middle class also concern 
Russians in general. This result suggests that the division between the middle class and other 
segments of Russian society may not be so deep, but instead that there are many common 
causes or criticisms that society in general might make of the state.  










































































A noteworthy difference here is that members of these middle class groups tend to be more 
critical than the general population. While the general population only evaluated four 
problems more negatively over a four-year period, all middle class groups were found five or 
six issues to be more problematic over the same period. Education and the influence of the 
oligarchs were increasingly of concern to the middle class groups, but do not register for the 
general population.  
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 Yet thinking critically about these problems is not only a question of kind, but also 
of degree. More members of the middle class tended to rate these problems negatively than 
did the general population. For example, figure 3.4 above compares evaluations of 
corruption between middle class groups and the general population. Although corruption 
saw the biggest increase in negative evaluations for the general population, the middle class 
groups still consistently viewed it as a much more serious problem than did the general 
population. 
 
VIII. Concerns in the Capitals 
Respondents from Moscow and St. Petersburg were generally more critical than 
members of other middle class groups. A larger percentage of respondents from the capitals 
tended to identify an issue as a problem for the country, and they were frequently the most 
negative of the middle class groups. For example, concern for the standard of living of the 
population significantly increased for all groups including the general population (figure 3.8). 
Although this issue was of concern to a large segment of respondents, it was typically of 




A similar effect is visible with corruption (figure 3.1). This suggests that residents of the 
major cities are more likely to identify problems for the country and to be critical of the state 
than a member of the middle class might be. 
Residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg also showed more precipitous increases in 
concern for several issues over the course of 2011. An example of this is the 20-percentage 
point increase in concern for the standard of living in April 2011. This trend suggests that 
residents of Moscow and St. Petersburg might be more reactive to news or current events 
and are thus better informed than others. Alternatively, they are more networked and more 
willing to speak to others about their concerns, which could amplify an increase spurred by a 
news event. 
 While the concerns of the middle class were generally in line with those of the 




























































































Petersburg hold different attitudes from the general Russian population. This suggests that 
the experience of living in a major metropolitan capital has a greater impact on one‘s political 
views and perception of the state than do indicators of middle class membership, like higher 
education or higher income. It is therefore possible that residents of major cities might one 
day play role of constraining government power and advocating for political rights, which is 
in some theories the purview of a strong middle class. Such a role would make use of the 
outsize political weight and social capital carried by residents of the capitals, particularly in 
Moscow.    
 
IX. Middle Class Protest 
Given the limitations on the data, these surveys can tell us only generally about the 
concerns of the middle class. They also cannot tell us whether these rising concerns resulted 
in protest activity, or if other factors were involved. Even as certain concerns were becoming 
more urgent in Moscow, not everyone who shared those worries participated in the electoral 
cycle protests of 2011-2012. While those events were larger than earlier protests, they were 
not particularly large in the when compared to the population of Moscow. Further, these 
surveys cannot indicate which of these rising concerns might have motivated protest activity 
at all; for instance, concerns about housing and utilities might not be relevant to participants 
in demonstrating against election fraud.  
Comparing the conclusions drawn from these surveys to an additional data set can 
shed light on this question. I will do so using a survey conducted online by Graeme 
Robertson between February 20-March 2, 2012 of 1213 middle class adults. Urban middle 
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class membership was defined by internet use, at least some higher education, the ability to 
buy at least some consumer durables, and residence in cities of over 1 million. I will compare 
results from the WCIOM study to Robertson‘s responses to the question "Which of the 
following are the most important problems facing Russia today?‖. Respondents were able to 
select up to three issues. 
Figure 3.9 presents the top five concerns for the middle class in general, as compared 




Source: Graeme Robertson 
Note: For middle class protest participants, three issues tied for the fifth-most significant issue. 
 
Three of these options are roughly consistent with the responses of our middle class groups 
in the WCIOM data set. Corruption and housing were of significant concern in both 


















































Figure 3.9: Five most significant issues, all middle class respondents and middle class protest participants, 
February-March 2012  
Middle Class (1213 respondents) Middle Class Protest Participants (79 respondents)
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course of the WCIOM surveys and so is not considered here. The stratification between rich 
and poor and the number of immigrants were not options in the WCIOM surveys.  
Economic issues are of concern to both groups. Societal stratification—or 
inequality—was rated highly by the middle class in general, and was also a top issue for those 
who attended protests. The importance of this issue makes sense, as the middle class is often 
framed as the victim of rising inequality; as income poles diverge, the middle class shrinks. 
This threat, coupled with concern about inflation, suggests that the middle class does not 
feel economically stable. Corruption, as discussed above, might aggravate this feeling. Unlike 
the middle class in general, those who attended protests felt that poverty was a more 
important issue than inequality, though they themselves are not poor. This suggests that, 
while the middle class in general is concerned with economic issues, those who attended 
protests view economic issues sociotropically, and are worried about other social groups in 
addition to their own. While it is unclear if this sentiment predates the protests, the 
protestors‘ concern for poverty over their own standard of living underscores again the 
fragility of the social contract, as it suggests that some people are not satisfied by an increase 
in their own standard of living, but that prosperity should be shared with everyone. 
Concerns about corruption and inequality likely resonate with this concern. 
 The concerns of those who participated in the electoral cycle protests also departed 
from the middle class as a whole. They were concerned about several of the same issues that 
the general middle class was, such as corruption, housing and inflation, but protesters also 
found several democratic issues to be important, specifically the unfair judicial system and 
limitations on civil rights and democratic freedoms.  
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It is important to note that concern for the judicial system or for civil and 
democratic rights was by no means a determinant of protest participation, because these 
were not the leading issues among participants. We must also ask whether these people held 
long-standing democratic concerns, or whether attending the protests had impacted their 
views on democracy. Evidence from the WCIOM data set suggests the latter explanation: 
concern for democracy and human rights was generally stable and low until the end of 2011, 
indicating that the protests precipitated a major increase in concern for democracy, 
particularly in Moscow and St. Petersburg. It is thus likely that attending the protests 
contributed to how these respondents evaluated liberal-democratic problems in Russia. 
A look at other available cross tabs using Robertson‘s data provides additional 
insight to concerns about the problems of an unfair judicial system and civil and democratic 
rights. 26 percent of small business owners rated the unfair judicial system as an important 
problem, one might assume because they regularly encounter it in the course of doing 
business. This would be a long-standing democratic concern that they face on a regular basis. 
26 percent of respondents familiar with GOLOS (a domestic election monitor) also rated the 
unfair judicial system as an important problem. In this case, we might assume that these 
respondents are interested in issues of democracy and objected to the unfair judicial system 
on principle. After participants in the protests, the second largest group that cared about civil 
and democratic rights was respondents with higher degrees (15.6 percent), which also 
suggests concern on principle, rather than in response to recent events. The third largest 
group, again, was respondents familiar with GOLOS (15 percent), which similarly suggests 
that these people might have had a longer standing awareness and concern for democratic 
issues. We can thus assume that, while some interest in democratic issues among protest 
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participants may have been in response to the protests themselves, for others, concern for 
those issues had been longer-lived.  
Chapter IV: Conclusions 
This study asks if economic, democratic or state efficacy issues were becoming 
increasingly problematic for members of the professional middle class in Moscow and St. 
Petersburg, following the global financial crisis in late 2008 and in the lead-up to the 
electoral cycle protests beginning in December 2011. It finds that problems pertaining to 
several of these categories concerned the middle class during the period in question: the 
standard of living, corruption, housing, healthcare, education, and the influence of oligarchs. 
I argue two possible explanations for rising concern for these issues. First, these issues might 
relate to an overall failure to meet middle class expectations of a higher quality of life. 
Secondly, they might pertain to rising frustration with the interference of corruption in daily 
life and the state‘s inability or unwillingness to mitigate corruption. Both explanations 
suggest that the theorized social contract between the middle class and the state was 
sundered before the outbreak of protests following the fraudulent Duma elections on 
December 4, 2011.  
Rather than demonstrating a divide between the middle class and the Russian 
population in general, this study has indicated that the views of these groups are relatively in 
sync on the major issues named above. The middle class groups in several cases felt more 
strongly about the issues in question, but on no issue did the responses from the middle 
class members diverge greatly from the responses of the general population. This result 
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provides evidence to counter the idea that Russian society is increasingly polarized, and 
suggests that many basic concerns and values are held in common across the population.  
My analysis demonstrated that respondents from Moscow and St. Petersburg felt 
more strongly about problems in Russia than the general population and than members of 
the middle class groups. A large share of respondents from these cities typically rated a 
problem as important.  They were also more reactive than other groups, repeatedly 
displaying a steep increase in concern for a problem over the previous survey round. 
Particularly, they were concerned by the standard of living and corruption more than any 
other group. Further, though most survey respondents did not see democracy and human 
rights as a problem, respondents from Moscow and St. Petersburg displayed increased 
interest in these issues around the election protests. This suggests that they use these ideas as 
a framework to understand events in instances where they might directly impact the state, 
but not as general mode of relating to the state. 
A similar survey of middle class residents of major cities who participated in protests 
indicated that corruption, poverty, an unfair judicial system and limited civil rights and 
democratic freedoms were their most salient concerns. On the whole, members of the 
middle class responding to this survey selected corruption, lack of access to housing and the 
sharp stratification between the rich and poor as their major issues.  
These results comprise a picture of a social stratum that is disturbed by rising 
inequality. This includes economic inequality (the standard of living, poverty and 
stratification), inequality of power or privilege (corruption, the influence of oligarchs and the 
unfair judicial system), and inequality of service provision (housing and utilities, healthcare, 
education). Only in certain contexts is the concern for inequality applied to uneven political 
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rights, yet this, it seems, is what spurred the electoral cycle protests of 2011-2012. In 
interviews conducted by the author, the organizers of these protests repeatedly expressed 
anger, shame and sense of insult that although Russia is a democracy, those who truly hold 
the power decided the Duma and Presidential elections behind the scenes. Their votes, the 
fraud revealed, counted for nothing. The idea that their votes should all be counted equally, 
and that they as a group should have some political power, was a motivating idea for the 
protests. The greater landscape of pervasive and ever-more troubling inequality helps to 
explain why that political concern became relevant when it did, and why it brought so many 
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